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bstract
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance of knowledge, both tacit and codified, in the formation of the state of long-
erm expectations that drive firms’ decisions to search for innovation and to investment in R&D. The paper takes the post-Keynesian
heory as reference, associating it with the neo-Schumpeterian analysis of innovation dynamics. First, it is argued that knowledge
lays a crucial role in building agents’ confidence, emphasizing that radical innovations are more dependent on the accumulation of
odified knowledge, given the higher degree of uncertainty associated with this type of innovation, while incremental innovations
re more dependent on tacit knowledge about the current market conditions and technological trajectory. Second, it is argued that
he accumulation of knowledge and the constant introduction of innovations foster the creation of a convention to innovate, which
acilitates the decision to pursue innovations by influencing long-term expectations.
 2014 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
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esumo
O objetivo desse artigo é discutir a importância do conhecimento, tanto tácito como codificado, para a formac¸ão do estado de
xpectativas de longo prazo que orienta as decisões das firmas quanto à busca de inovac¸ões e ao investimento em P&D. O artigo toma
 teoria Pós-Keynesiana como referência, associando-a à análise Neo-Schumpeteriana da inovac¸ão. Primeiro, argumenta-se que o
onhecimento desempenha um papel crucial na elevac¸ão da confianc¸a dos agentes, enfatizando que as abordagens Pós-Keynesiana e
eo-Schumpeteriana são complementares, uma vez que a primeira coloca maior ênfase no conhecimento tácito e a segunda coloca
aior ênfase no conhecimento codificado. Segundo, argumenta-se que que a acumulac¸ão de conhecimento e a constante introduc¸ãoE-mail address: jpr49@cam.ac.uk
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de inovac¸ões contribuem para a criac¸ão de uma convenc¸ão a inovar, a qual facilita a decisão de busca de inovac¸ões ao influenciar
as expectativas de longo prazo.
© 2014 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
Palavras chave: Inovac¸ão; Teoria Pós-Keynesiana; Abordagem Neo-Schumpeteriana; Tecnologia
1.  Introduction
The main branch of post-Keynesian theory emphasizes the role of money and banks in determining the level
of investment, which in turn determines the levels of employment, production and income. By contrast, the neo-
Schumpeterian theory emphasizes the importance of technological progress in the determination of the levels of
production, employment and income.
Although innovation is rarely addressed in Keynes’ works, it is possible to identify at least four channels through
which the post-Keynesian theory can be combined with the neo-Schumpeterian theory to better understand the dynamics
of innovation.1 Firstly, several studies have sought to combine these traditions to understand the relationship between
innovation and financial system dynamics, since both approaches consider money and banks as non-neutral (e.g.
Gerschenkron, 1962; Zysman, 1983; Christensen, 1992; O’Sullivan, 2005; Henriques, 2007; Crocco et al., 2008;
Raposo and Resende, 2012; Romero and Jayme Jr., 2012). Secondly, post-Keynesians have also sought to use Keynes’
models of asset choice and of formation of expectations to understand the determinants of innovation (e.g. Crocco,
2003, 2008), given that both approaches stress the role of uncertainty in shaping firms’ decisions (e.g. Dosi, 1982;
Cimoli and Dosi, 1995; Dequech, 1999a). Thirdly, studies of Keynesian–Kaldorian orientation have combined the two
insights investigating the impacts of demand growth (via specialization and division of labour a  la  Kaldor, 1966),
technological diffusion and innovation effort on productivity growth (e.g. Oliveira et al., 2006). Fourthly, studies have
also attempted to establish a relationship between innovation and trade, using the Keynesian–Kaldorian balance-of-
payments constrained growth models as benchmark (e.g. Fagerberg, 1988; Resende and Raposo, 2008; Jayme Jr. and
Resende, 2009; Romero et al., 2011). However, much remains to be explained within each of these research topics.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the importance of knowledge, both tacit and codified, in the formation of
the state of long-term expectations, which drives firms’ decisions to search for innovation and to invest in R&D. The
paper takes the post-Keynesian theory as reference, associating it with the neo-Schumpeterian analysis of innovation
dynamics. First, it is argued that knowledge plays a crucial role in building agents’ confidence, emphasizing that radical
innovations are more dependent on the accumulation of codified knowledge, given the higher degree of uncertainty
associated with this type of innovation, while incremental innovations are more dependent on tacit knowledge about
the current market conditions and technological trajectory. Second, it is argued that the accumulation of knowledge and
the constant introduction of innovations foster the creation of a convention to innovate, which facilitates the decision to
pursue innovations by influencing long-term expectations. Thus, knowledge influences both immediate determinants
of the state  of long-term expectations, confidence and expectations, providing strong incentives to pursue innovation.
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 discusses the post-Keynesian theory, which represents the main
framework of the paper. Section 3 briefly discusses the neo-Schumpeterian theory related to innovative dynamics.
Section 4 discusses how the post-Keynesian theory can contribute to improve the understanding of the innovation
process. Finally, Section 5 presents the paper’s concluding remarks.
2.  The  post-Keynesian  theory:  an  overview
The purpose of this section is to discuss the foundations of the post-Keynesian theory. The first part of this section
introduces the fundamental axioms of this theory, which guides the more careful analysis of this tradition carried out
in the subsequent parts of this section. It is worth noting, however, that this section is not intended to establish an
exhaustive discussion of the controversies related to the post-Keynesian theory. Rather, following some of Keynes’
1 See Paula (2011) for a more general analysis on the compatibility of Keynes and Schumpeter’s ideas.
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ost-Keynesian interpreters, this section’s analysis seeks to provide a review of Keynes’ central ideas and connect the
arious aspects of the post-Keynesian theory, taking into account the central objective of the paper, which is to analyse
he contributions of this theory for understanding innovative dynamics.
.1.  Fundamentals
According to Carvalho (1989), the post-Keynesian theory can be summarized in five fundamental axioms: (i) the
xiom of production; (ii) the axiom of decision; (iii) the axiom of absence of pre-reconciliation of plans; (iv) the axiom
f irreversibility of time; and (v) the axiom of the properties of money.
The first axiom postulates that firms produce aiming to accumulate money. Since agents must produce before
onsume, production is the starting point of economic processes. The decision to produce, in turn, is made by ﬁrms,
hich are economic agents not reducible to their owners, given that the goal of firms is to profit, while the goal of
heir owners is to consume. This means that the firm seeks wealth in its most general form, i.e. monetary wealth, given
hat it always seeks to invest this wealth where it is most profitable. To paraphrase Carvalho (1989: 183), although
o produce with efficiency is a goal, an even more important goal is to be able to sell the production in the market.
ence, this axiom stresses that firms’ decisions about the level of production are guided by the possibility of obtaining
onetary profits.
The second axiom postulates that firms decide about the levels of production, employment and income in the
conomy. This derives from the fact that firms are the agents who decide when, where, and how much capital should be
sed. According to Carvalho (1989: 183), the second axiom is equivalent to saying that the economy is subordinated to
he firms’ goal of multiplying monetary wealth, so that although consumption may be the ultimate goal of production,
t must be subordinated to firms’ immediate objective of obtaining profits.
The third axiom postulates that in a monetary production economy, the existence of money allows the factors of
roduction not to decide a  priori  when and in what products to convert their monetary income. This results directly
rom the institution of cash payments, which implies a mismatch between production and consumption a priori. The
xistence of money, therefore, makes imbalances between aggregate supply and demand possible (i.e. deficiencies
f effective demand – Keynes, 1970, Chapter 3), given that it allows part of the income to be retained in the form
f money. Hence, the non-pre-conciliation of plans makes market performance uncertain. However, since production
recedes consumption, the decision of how much to produce must be made based on expectations  about the future
evel of consumption.2
The fourth axiom postulates that after an investment is made, it cannot be undone without bearing certain costs. In
ther words, time is unidirectional (Carvalho, 1989: 185).3 According to the third axiom, investment decisions must
e made based on expectations, since there is no guarantee that expected demand will be effectively  verified. Thus, the
act that expectations might be unfulfilled and that it is not possible to reverse realized investments exacerbates the
ncertainty involved in firms’ decision-making. In the post-Keynesian approach, uncertainty refers to the impossibility
f knowing the possible future scenarios and of assigning correct probabilities to each expected future scenario.
Finally, the fifth axiom refers to the fundamental characteristics  of money: (i) that money has null or negligible
lasticity of production and (ii) that money has null or negligible asset in a monetary production economy.4 Having a
ull or negligible elasticity of production indicates the impossibility of expanding the production of money when its
emand increases. In other words, the response of employment in the production of money to increases in the demand
or money is null, since the production of money is a monopoly of the monetary authority and cannot increase freely.
hus, given that the money supply is relatively fixed, its value is more reluctant to fall.5 Having null or negligible
lasticity substitution, in turn, indicates that money is not easily replaceable. According to Keynes (1970: 231), “this
2 Carvalho (1989: 184–185) points out that in neoclassical economics, disappointment of expectations can only occur in terms of sectoral allocation
f resources, since it is assumed that all income must be consumed. In the post-Keynesian approach, however, the verification of losses in some
ectors may not correspond to extraordinary gains in other sectors. Paraphrasing Carvalho (1989: 185), in monetary production economies there is
othing ensuring that disappointment of expectations generates a process of gravitation around a fixed point of resource allocation.
3 Amado (2000) provides a good review of conceptions of time and non-ergodicity in the post-Keynesian tradition.
4 The functions of money are not discussed here. See Keynes (1970) and Carvalho (1989).
5 According to Carvalho (1989: 188), the restricted supply of money imposes a limit on the expectations about the future purchasing power of the
onetary unit.
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follows from the peculiarity of money that its utility is solely derived from its exchange-value, so that the two rise and
fall pari  passu, with the results that as the exchange value of money rises there is no motive or tendency, as in the case
of rent-factors, to substitute some other factor for it”. Thus, this axiom indicates that money becomes an asset due to
its relatively stable value and due to the difficulty in replacing it with another asset.
These five axioms summarize the basic post-Keynesian interpretation of the mode of operation of a monetary
production economy. The level of production is determined by profit-seeking firms (axiom of production), which decide
when, where and how much to produce based on expectations about future economic activity (axiom of decision), given
that there is no pre-conciliation of plans compelling agents to spend all income earned (axiom of no pre-conciliation
of plans). The non-existence of pre-conciliation of plans makes the volume of sales uncertain, making possible for
expectations to be disappointed.6 Moreover, the irreversibility of investments exacerbates the problem of deciding the
appropriate production levels (axiom of irreversibility of time). Hence, in face of uncertain outcomes, agents often
prefer to hold money rather than risk investing (axiom of the characteristics of money). This creates the possibility
of deficiencies in effective demand that affect the levels of employment, production and income. The existence of
money, therefore, is not neutral to the economic activity neither in the short nor in the long term. In the short term, the
existence of money may harm the sales of current production (with the existing capital stock) due to deficiencies of
effective demand. In the long term, the existence of money influences investment decisions that determine the levels
of production, employment and income through its impact on the short term economic results, which guide long-term
expectations.
To sum up, the post-Keynesian approach represented by the five axioms discussed above rests on three pillars:
(i) uncertainty; (ii) expectations; and (iii) money. The existence of uncertainty  implies the formation of expectations
to guide firms’ decisions about production and investment, which introduces subjectivity into resource allocation
decisions and makes disappointments possible.7 According to Keynes (1937a: 213), disregarding this issue is a major
shortcoming of the neoclassical theory. Finally, the existence of money, which is the asset demanded in situations of
high uncertainty (given its stable value and high liquidity), creates the possibility of persistent unemployment and low
production due to deficiencies of effective demand.
It is crucial to note, however, that the concept of uncertainty used in the post-Keynesian theory refers not only to the
uncertainty about the probabilities associated with each possible future event, but also to the uncertainty about the list
of possible future events. Dosi and Egidi (1991: 145) differentiate substantive uncertainty, which refers to “the lack of
all the information which would be necessary to make decisions with certain outcomes”, and procedural uncertainty,
which refers to “limitations on the computational and cognitive capabilities of the agents to pursue unambiguously
their objectives, given the available information”. Dequech (2000), in turn, distinguishes between ambiguity, which
is the uncertainty about the probabilities associated with each future event, and fundamental uncertainty, which is
the uncertainty about the list of possible future events. Using these definitions, therefore, the concept of uncertainty
adopted here is encompasses both (substantive) ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty. Moreover, following Dequech
(1999a,b, 2000), Amado (2000) and Crocco (2003, 2008) the discussion presented in this paper considers that there
are different degrees  of uncertainty, optimism and confidence.
2.2.  Asset  choice  model
This section discusses Keynes’ (1970) model of asset choice. According to Keynes (1970), the demand for consumer
goods is a relatively stable proportion of national income (marginal propensity to consume). Thus, the volatility of
aggregate demand and output are associated with the volatility of the demand for investment goods (Carvalho, 1994:
77–78; Amado, 2000: 69). To understand how allocation decisions are made, therefore, the starting point is the
Keynesian asset choice model.
6 The impossibility of increasing employment in the production of money is crucial to understand why a rise in the demand for money affects
the levels of employment, production and income. Demand for money discourages production and does not compensate the fall in employment
with increased employment in the production of money. The demand for money, therefore, opens the possibility of deficiency of effective demand,
creating situations of equilibrium with unemployment or underemployment (Keynes, 1970: 236).
7 For a deeper explanation about the post-Keynesian conceptions of time, uncertainty and money, see Amado (2000).
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According to Keynes (1970, Chapters 11 and 17) the interest rate appears as a limit to the level of employment,
iven that for new investments to be made the marginal efficiency of capital must be above the interest rate.8 Keynes
1970) stresses that from the rate of interest on money it is possible to calculate specific interest rates for each asset in
he economy (in monetary values), so that the comparison of these rates indicates the levels of demand for each asset.
“The money rate of interest – we may remind the reader – is nothing more than the percentage excess of a sum
of money contracted for forward delivery, e.g. a year hence, over what we may call the ‘spot’ or ‘cash’ price of
the sum thus contracted for forward delivery” (Keynes, 1970: 222).
Keynes’ (1970) asset choice model is based on the fact that decisions about the purchase of different assets are
ecessarily forward-looking, as they depend on the expected  future returns of each asset in a given period. Thus, since
he future is surrounded by uncertainties, expectations play a crucial role in the estimation of assets’ own-rates of
nterest.
Four attributes determine the own-rate of interest of each asset in monetary terms: (i) the expected yield (q); (ii)
he carrying cost (c); (iii) the liquidity premium (l); and (iv) the expected appreciation (a). The sum of these attributes
ives the assets’ own-rate of interest, which measures its total expected return: a + q  −  c  + l.9 The term liquidity  refers
o the ability to quickly convert an asset into money without loss in its initial value. Thus, liquidity is a two-dimensional
oncept.10 From this definition it is possible to establish different levels of asset liquidity. The assets that need more
ime to be converted into money (without loss of value) are less liquid, while highly convertible assets are more liquid.
icks (1967) proposed a classification of three levels of liquidity: (i) the first level (most liquid) consists of money
nd its substitutes; (ii) the second level consists of net assets supported by secondary markets without guarantees in
elling prices (bonds); and (iii) the third level consists of illiquid assets without organized markets, which cannot be
eld as a store of value given the uncertainty surrounding their resale (capital goods). According to Keynes (1970),
herefore, the basic difference between money and capital goods is that for the former, the liquidity premium exceeds
he carrying costs, while for the latter (and other goods in general) the returns exceed the carrying costs in spite of its
ow liquidity premium.11 Moreover, since the greater the risk (r) of an investment is, the lower its liquidity premium
l) is, then r  = −l, and the previous formulation can be changed to: a  + q −  c −  r (Keynes, 1970: 240).
The asset choice model stresses that different expectations lead to different asset choices. Given that q  and a  are
xpected values, changes in agents’ perception of the degree of uncertainty of future results affects the prices of all
ssets. Thus, an increase in uncertainty not only reduces the expected returns (q) and the expected appreciation (a)
f different assets, but it also increases the importance attributed to the liquidity premium (l) (Carvalho, 1994: 89;
aula, 1999).12 Note that money is the most flexible form of wealth, and the demand for liquidity is associated with
he demand for ﬂexibility  to adapt to unforeseen events, which is actually a demand for security (Keynes, 1970: 226;
arvalho, 1989: 180). This situation, therefore, is characterized by an increase in the liquidity preference. Hence,
ach state of long-term expectation is associated with a particular level of liquidity preference, which determines the
xpected values of each variable in the model.
The model of asset choice demonstrates that there is an interaction between the assets in the process of price
ormation, since variations in the demand for an asset (e.g. money) influence the demand for other assets (e.g. capital
oods). As discussed in the previous section, Keynes (1970) puts especial emphasis on the importance of money as
 highly liquid asset that is demanded when uncertainty rises. Taking into account the characterization proposed by
icks (1967), high uncertainty leads to a contraction of the demand/production of capital goods at the expense ofncreased demand for money and securities. Consequently, the model demonstrates why money is non-neutral neither
n the short nor in the long term.
8 The marginal efficiency of capital is given by the ratio between the expected yield resulting from the use of this capital and the costs of this
apital (Keynes, 1970, Chapter 11).
9 Note that in order to compare the rates of different assets it is necessary to calculate the rates over equal periods of retention.
10 Market efficiency is another factor that influences the attribute of liquidity of an asset, since more efficient markets increase the agents’ confidence
egarding the conversion of assets into money without significant loss. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Carvalho (1989).
11 According to Carvalho (1994: 84), “it is the latter attribute that allows us to consider money as an asset and to compare its ‘return’ with the value
eturns offered by other assets”.
12 The demand for security, therefore, is associated with the demand for ﬂexibility to adapt to unforeseen events. According to Carvalho (1989:
80), money is the most flexible form of wealth.
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2.3.  Finance  and  the  non-neutrality  of  banks
The asset choice model identifies the determinants of demand for investment. However, to understand what deter-
mines the level of investment in each economy it is also necessary to analyse other factors that make investment
possible. Among these factors, the availability and form of investment finance is particularly important.
In neoclassical growth theory, investment is determined by savings (e.g. Sollow, 1956). Hence, fostering higher
savings leads to higher investment. Thus, this approach assumes the neutrality (passiveness) of banks in relation to the
investment process. In the neoclassical tradition, money supply is exogenous to the economic system, determined by
the monetary authority, and banks work only as intermediaries between savers and investors (Amado, 2000).
Post-Keynesian theory describes the process of investment in a radically different form. For Keynes and the post-
Keynesian, money supply is partly  endogenous to the economic system, and although influenced by the actions of the
monetary authority, it is also influenced by banks’ decisions to lend.13 In post-Keynesian theory, banking firms have
similar characteristics to other firms, being also subject to uncertainty (Keynes, 1970: 158). According to Dow (1993),
therefore, the asset choice model and the theory of liquidity preference apply to the decisions to demand for all assets,
whether by banks or by other agents.14 Thus, as every firm working in a monetary production economy, banks decide
how to allocate the money they hold following expectations and the asset choice model.
The level of liquidity preference (expectations) of banks, therefore, directs their decisions about asset allocation,
determining how much they lend (i.e. demand less liquid assets) and how much they demand financial assets (i.e.
more liquid assets). These decisions, produce a crucial impact on the level of economic activity. Banks’ decisions can
either follow the same direction of the central bank’s policy, or follow an opposite direction. Hence, different banking
strategies can magnify or reduce the objectives of the policy adopted by the monetary authority. Consequently, due to
banks’ influence on the determination of money supply (credit) and of interest rates, banks have direct impacts on the
levels of investment, output and employment (Keynes, 1970: 158; Paula, 1999: 177).15 This highlights the crucial role
of banks in determining the pace of capital accumulation in a monetary production economy.
2.4.  The  ﬁnance–investment–savings–funding  circuit  (FISF)
In the previous section it was argued that the level of investment finance depends on banks’ decisions regarding the
allocation of their resources, so that money supply is partly endogenous. In this framework, ex  ante  savings are not
necessary to generate investment, given that it is banking finance that enables investment.
In post-Keynesian theory, it is investment that generates savings, while the accounting equality between them is
only verified ex  post. After an investment is made, the income multiplier operates, and given that consumption is a
fixed proportion of income, at the end of the process the sum of the savings of all agents equals the initial investment.
According to Keynes (1937b), the process of investment unfolds in two steps. In the first step, planned (ex  ante)
investment, realized when savings have not yet been created via the income multiplier, corresponds to the short-term
credit demanded by firms to initiate the investment – demand for money due to the ﬁnance  motive. In the second step,
the actual (ex  post) investment, which corresponds to aggregate savings that arise via the income multiplier at the end
of the process, is carried out. According to Keynes (1937b), ex  ante  investment is justified by the fact that investment
finance must occur before the investment is effectively made. There is no plausible explanation justifying the equality
between ex  ante  savings and ex  ante  investment. Firstly, it is not necessary for people to decide beforehand about how
much they will save in the future, as they often do not know how much will their future income be. Secondly, and more
importantly, “the ex  ante  saver has no cash, but is cash that the ex  ante  investor requires” (Keynes, 1937b: 665–666).
Liquidity preference determines both the level of ex  ante  investment (finance) and the level of the interest rate
(Keynes, 1937b: 664–665). Most importantly, it is banks’ liquidity preference that determines the amount of credit
13 For a deeper discussion on the endogeneity of money in the post-Keynesian theory, see Carvalho (1993).
14 It must be noted that liquidity preference is not the same as demand for money, given that the demand for money due to the ﬁnance motive
actually refers to the demand for loans to purchase capital goods, representing, therefore, low liquidity preference.
15 According to Minsky (1986), banks do not administrate their liabilities passively, but actively seek to introduce financial innovations that allow
them to escape regulation, raise credit and expand their liabilities. Banks, therefore, are active (not passive) agents that dynamically manage their
assets and liabilities (Paula, 1999: 173).
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ranted in the economy. This occurs because bank finance does not necessarily employ savings.16 The conclusion
erived from the process described is obvious: “this means that, in general, the banks hold the key position in the
ransition from a lower to a higher scale of activity” (Keynes, 1937b: 668).
According to Keynes (1937b), however, at the end of the investment process, the savings that result from it can be
sed to transform investors’ short-term debt into long-term liabilities. This transformation happens through the issuance
f stocks, i.e. through firms’ funding, which completes the ﬁnance–investment–savings–funding  (FISF) circuit. The
xistence of organized financial markets, therefore, not only allows funding  to take place, but it also influences firms’
isposition to invest and banks disposition to finance such investments.
For Keynes (1970, Chapter 12: 151), the fundamental function of financial markets is to facilitate exchanges,
ncreasing the liquidity of long-term assets (for individual stock-market investors) and thereby reducing the uncer-
ainty associated with these assets. Nonetheless, financial markets are also particularly important for information
issemination, given that these markets collaborate to: (i) signal prices of new stocks; (ii) reduce underwriting risk due
o the presence of specialized financial institutions; and (iii) enable investors’ assessment of the profitability of new
tocks (Studart, 1995). Hence, well organized secondary markets encourage investment by allowing periodic reviews
f investment decisions.
However, the speculative nature of financial markets generates instability as well, which can lead to crises and
urb economic growth (Keynes, 1970: 145, 158; Minsky, 1986).17 While speculative investors seek to predict market
sychology, enterprise investors seek to predict the expected returns of investments (Keynes, 1970: 158). Nonetheless,
s Keynes (1970) argues, the same mechanism that generates crises generates growth as well, given that:
“The liquidity of investment market often facilitates, thought it sometimes impedes, the course of new investment.
For the fact that each individual investor flatters himself that his commitment is “liquid” (though this cannot be
true for all investors collectively [as one’s gain is another’s loss]) calms his nerves and makes him much more
willing to run a risk” (Keynes, 1970: 160).
For Keynes, therefore, the absence of financial markets constrains economic growth, as it limits the process of
unding, which allows firms to equate the terms of their obligations to the maturity of their investments.18 Moreover, the
haracteristics of each country’s financial system (Gerschenkron, 1962; Zysman, 1983), the degree of its development
Dow, 1993), and the form it is regulated directly influence the system’s ability to foster investment.
To sum up, this brief discussion emphasizes the dual importance of financial systems for economic growth, given
he crucial role they play in determining both finance and funding.
.5.  Uncertainty,  expectations,  conventions  and  conﬁdence
As argued in the previous sections, in the post-Keynesian tradition, decisions regarding the allocation of resources
n a monetary production economy depend directly on expectations  about the future returns of different assets. This
bservation stresses the importance of understanding how these expectations are formed.Keynes (1970: 46–47, 145–146) defined two types of expectations: (i) short-term expectations (STE), and (ii) long-
erm expectations (LTE).19 Short-term expectations are related to decisions regarding how much to be produced under
resent conditions (existing stock of capital, demand, etc.). In this case, therefore, the capital stock is considered fixed.
16 It is important to stress that Keynes (1937b) does not mean that investment is not financed by savings. Instead, he argues that finance through
redit and through the allocation of existing savings happen simultaneously. However, Keynes (1937b) seeks to emphasize that: (i) investment
nance can occur independently of savings and (ii) that in monetary production economies bank finance (credit) predominates. “In the main the flow
f new finance required by current ex-ante investment is provided by the finance released by current ex-post investment” (Keynes, 1937b: 666).
17 The Minskyana approach to financial crises will not be discussed in this paper, despite its importance in the post-Keynesian tradition, since it is
eyond the direct purpose of this paper’s scope. For an analysis that incorporates Minsky’s approach, see Raposo and Resende (2008).
18 As Keynes (1970: 160) argued, “This is the dilemma. So long as it is open to the individual to employ his wealth in hoarding or lending money,
he alternative of purchasing actual capital assets cannot be rendered sufficiently attractive (. . .), except by organizing markets wherein these assets
an be easily realized for money”.
19 Discussing the concept of expectations (short-term, in particular) in Keynes, Dequech (1999a) argues that the post-Keynesian view is not
ompatible neither with rational expectations, since it is pervaded by uncertainty, nor with adaptive expectations, due to the fact that Keynes (1970:
0) stresses that “it is sensible for producers to base their expectations on the assumption that the most recently realized results will continue, except
n so far as there are deﬁnite reasons for expecting a change” (emphasis added).
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Long-term expectations, in turn, relate to decisions regarding the allocation of resources with long-term maturity, as
investments, taking into account future conditions (changes in the stock of capital, preferences, wages, etc.). In this
case, therefore, the capital stock is variable. These two expectations differ mainly regarding: (i) the period of time
involved in the process; (ii) the magnitude of resources expended in each decision; and (iii) the amount of uncertainty
about future outcomes involved in each decision (Crocco, 2008: 278). According to Crocco (2008), the period of time
necessary to make a decision and adjust for errors (and the associated costs) is significantly smaller in the formation
of STE in relation to LTE.20 Thus, LTE are associated with degrees of uncertainty considerably higher than the ones
associated with STE.
The relationship between STE and LTE is a matter of debate in the post-Keynesian tradition. Kregel (1976) highlights
three different models used by Keynes. The first model, called the “static model”, assumes that LTE are constant and
that STE are always satisfied.21 The second model, called the “stationary equilibrium model”, assumes that STE can
be unfulfilled without affecting LTE.22 And the third model, called “alternate equilibrium model”, assumes that STE
disappointments affect LTE. However, since the second model is the model that seems to predominate in the first 18
chapters of The  General  Theory, the discussion presented in this paper follows this model.23
Keynes (1970) pointed out, however, that credit and investment depend not only on LTE, but also on the confidence
agents have in these expectations or predictions. According to Dequech (1999a: 417), therefore, for Keynes, the state
of LTE depends: (i) on LTE themselves (prognostics) and (ii) on the confidence in the LTE. In the words of Keynes,
“The facts of the existing situation enter, in a sense disproportionately, into the formation of our long-term
expectations; our usual practice [(or convention) to form expectations] being to take the existing situation and
to project it into the future, modified only to the extent that we have more or less definite reasons for expecting
a change. The state of long-term expectations, upon which our decisions are based, does not solely depend,
therefore, on the most  probable  forecast  we can make. It also depends on the conﬁdence  with which we make
this forecast” (Keynes, 1970: 148 – first emphasis added).24
Given the importance of the state of LTE in determining credit and investment, therefore, this section discusses the
determinants of this state.
According Dequech (1999a,b: 421), confidence depends on: (i) uncertainty perception, which depends on agents’
optimistic disposition and knowledge and (ii) uncertainty aversion, which depend solely on agents’ optimistic
disposition.25 According to Crocco (2003: 183–184) and Dequech (1999b: 422, 424), the impact of knowledge on confi-
dence works through the so-called “social weight of argument”, which justifies a particular course of action (decision).26
This weight, in turn, influences agents’ uncertainty perception. Consequently, in this approach, knowledge influences
confidence through uncertainty perception.
Dequech (1999a: 73, 1999b: 420) associated optimistic  disposition  with animal  spirits. For Dequech (2000: 162),
however, “situations of fundamental uncertainty are not reduced to a simple dichotomy between action and inaction [as
done by Keynes]; rather, there can be different  types  of  action, depending on the quality and the intensity of the optimistic
disposition to face uncertainty. The idea to be conveyed is that of a disposition that comes in (ordinal) degrees and is
combined with optimism or pessimism”.27 It is crucial to note, however, that Dequech (1999a,b) distinguishes between
optimistic disposition and spontaneous optimism. Nonetheless, he does not make clear enough how these two concepts
20 This paper does not seek to develop a deeper analysis of the relationship between STE and LTE in the post-Keynesian theory. See Kregel (1976)
and Crocco (2008) for discussions on this topic.
21 According to Kregel (1976: 214), this model was used by Keynes for exposition purposes, aiming to highlight the possibility of equilibrium
with unemployment even without disappointment of expectations.
22 For Kregel (1976: 215), Keynes used this model to highlight the role of effective demand in determining employment.
23 Carvalho (1989: 189) seems to adopt the same position.
24 According Dequech (1999a) and Crocco (2003) (amongst others), the convention of projecting the present into the future is a way to deal with
the uncertainty that pervades decision processes.
25 Keynes does not explicitly distinguish the influence of animal spirits on LTE from its influence on confidence.
26 Dequech (1999b: 424) does not use the term “social” in his analysis. He argues that “weight and confidence must be distinguished. Weight is
linked to perceived uncertainty, while confidence depends also on uncertainty aversion”.
27
“Most probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only
be taken as a result of our animal spirits – of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as a outcome of a weighted average of
quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities” (Keynes, 1970: 161 – emphasis added).
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iffer. Dequech (1999b: 420) seems to associate spontaneous optimism with Keynes’ concept of animal spirits, while he
ssociates optimistic disposition (animal spirits redefined by him) with “confident optimism” (Dequech, 1999a: 73).28
owever, since optimistic disposition cannot be at the same time a determinant of confidence and confidence itself, this
aper avoids to separate spontaneous optimism from optimistic disposition and does not interpret optimistic disposition
s “confident optimism”. Instead, in this paper the term animal spirits is associated with optimistic disposition only to
tress that agents can have different degrees  of optimism (or disposition to act).
Knowledge, in turn, can be divided into: (i) codified knowledge and (ii) tacit knowledge.29 The post-Keynesian
pproach, in turn, places greater emphasis on the importance of tacit knowledge (e.g. learning-by-doing) in building
onfidence and the state of LTE.
Knowledge not only influences uncertainty perception, but it also affects LTE through conventions, which are
nformal (tacit) institutions. Hodgson (2006: 2) defines institutions as “the system of established and prevalent social
ules that structure social interactions”. Two aspects of this definition must be stressed: (i) that institutions are enduring30
nd (ii) that institutions are social  rules. Regarding the durability of conventions, it is interesting to note that although
hey provide some stability to the system (Keynes, 1970: 152), they also hinder transformations.31 In relation to the
ocial aspect of the conventions, Crocco (2003: 180) emphasizes that the existence of conventions presupposes a “social
nowledge” about the conventions.32 According to Crocco (2003: 181), however, in a situation of collective uncertainty,
ocial knowledge is poor, so that it is only possible to know the likely  course of action of agents. Social knowledge,
herefore, becomes uncertain (probable).33 Two important implications follow from this analysis. First, although
onventional behaviour helps guiding decisions, it does not eliminate the uncertainty inherent to forward-looking
ecisions. Second, conventions are directly related to the level of social knowledge.34
According to Dequech (1999a, 2000), in addition to knowledge and optimistic disposition, creativity influences
he formation of LTE as well. He defines creativity as “the mental creation of aspects of the future that are radically
ifferent from the present” (Dequech, 1999a: 73).
For Dequech (1999a: 73, 1999b: 418, 2000: 160), therefore, the state of LTE is ultimately determined by three
actors: (i) knowledge; (ii) optimistic disposition; and (iii) creativity.
The relationships described in the paragraphs above are represented in Fig. 1. This figure shows that both optimistic
isposition and knowledge exert a double impact on the state  of LTE, since both influence the formation of LTE and
he confidence in these expectations.
Thus, assuming the existence of different degrees of uncertainty, optimism (or optimistic disposition) and confidence,
he state  of LTE will vary with the degrees of optimism and confidence prevalent in the economy.35 Consequently, the
tate of LTE can be either strongly  positive  (very confident positive LTE), weakly  positive  (not very confident positive
TE), strongly  negative  (very confident negative LTE), or weakly  negative  (not very confident negative LTE). Hence,
trengthening this state  of expectations is crucial to expand credit (by banks) and investments (by firms).
It is also important to note that from the society’s perspective, the strength of this state is related to the degree of
ts generalization. In other words, the strength of this state is related to the social  weight of argument (which derives
rom social knowledge) in favour of investments. Thus, strongly positive state of LTE is observed when, in the face of
ositive expectations, a large number of agents chooses to invest, indicating high confidence and optimism. A weakly
ositive state of LTE, in contrast, is observed when even in face of positive expectations little investment is made,
ndicating weak confidence and optimism.
28 Dequech (1999b: 420) states also that “spontaneous optimism means optimism not based on any knowledge”.
29 Tacit knowledge is the knowledge that can only be obtained by practical experience and is hard to codify. See also Crocco (2003).
30 See Crocco (2003) for a discussion of conventions in the post-Keynesian theory.
31 It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the process of institutional change or the process of formation of conventions. In this regard, see
odgson (1988, 2006) and North (1990). Although the understanding of the formation and change of institutions is of great importance to understand
ore clearly the process of decision-making, for the analysis presented in this paper it is enough to recognize the importance of knowledge in the
onformation of conventions.
32 Crocco (2003) emphasizes the importance of social knowledge related to the rights and obligations related to each “position” in society (e.g.
he position of the parent, of the postman, of the investor, etc.). Thus, “for a routine to be established, all actors affected by this routine must have a
ommon understanding about the situation in which that specific routine applies” (Crocco, 2003: 181).
33 It is important to recall that probably does not mean that all possible future states are known.
34 Dequech (1999: 74) seems to share this view.
35 Recall that although optimistic disposition influences confidence, the two are not the same.
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The analysis of investment developed by Hirschman (1958) can contribute to better clarify the idea presented here.
Hirschman (1958) distinguishes between two types of investments: (i) induced investment – driven by increases in
demand or external economies caused by the implementation of previous investments and (ii) autonomous investment
– investment decisions independent of demand pressures and external economies. According to the author, induced
investment decisions are easier, given the reduced uncertainty that pervades them. Autonomous investment decisions,
in turn, require greater ability  to  invest, which is used to assess the economic conditions and possibilities of investment
success. The ability  to  invest  corresponds to the tacit knowledge previously mentioned, being acquired through the
practice of investment, i.e. through continued growth – learn-by-doing  (Kaldor, 1966). Hence, this analysis emphasizes
the importance of tacit knowledge in the post-Keynesian approach.
A strongly positive state of LTE can be identified when the response of induced investment to demand pressures is
high, i.e. when a large number of agents are willing to invest under favourable circumstances (or lower uncertainty).
The acquisition of greater ability to invest (tacit knowledge), in turn, contributes to raise the level of investment (both
induced and autonomous), since it strengthens the state of LTE.
The analysis presented here, therefore, forms a circuit of cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1957) in which growth
increases the ability to invest, which strengthens the state  of LTE, which motivates further investment and growth.
Finally, it is important to connect the arguments outlined throughout this section with the arguments presented
in the previous sections. Due to uncertainty, knowledge and optimism play central roles in investment decisions.
Through their impacts on the state of LTE, these variables influence both the demand for investments by firms and
the disposition of banks to provide the resources (finance) that make these investments possible. Therefore, in periods
of greater uncertainty, as in the downward phase of the business cycle, both firms and banks have higher liquidity
preference, which means less demand for illiquid assets – investment and credit, respectively. The opposite is observed
in the upward phase, when positive expectations generate a prospect of continued growth and rising asset prices. In this
scenario, greater optimism and confidence reduce the liquidity preference of firms and banks, motivating continuous
increases in investment and credit, respectively.36
3.  The  neo-Schumpeterian  approach
Unlike the post-Keynesian theory, in which innovation is rarely addressed, in the neo-Schumpeterian tradition,
innovation occupies a central place. In this approach, innovations are crucial to sustain economic growth, since they
raise productivity, profitability and income.
In the neo-Schumpeterian theory, the creation and incorporation of technology depend on the economy’s existing
institutional arrangements.37 This apparatus, called National Innovation System (NIS – Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992),
determines the incentives for innovation in each country.38 The formation of this institutional setting, however, involves
considerable efforts and costs (Gerschenkron, 1962; Lall, 1992; Jacobsson, 1993).39
The neo-Schumpeterian approach stresses the different characteristics of NISs in developed and underdeveloped
countries, arguing that the NISs in developed countries put greater emphasis on the creation  of innovations, while
in developing countries NISs are more focused on the absorption  of innovations created in developed countries.
This difference is explained by the fact that the costs of incorporating technology developed abroad are considerably
lower than the costs of creating new technologies. Thus, developing countries can benefit from their technological
backwardness by absorbing foreign technology (Posner, 1961). This process of technological diffusion from developed
to underdeveloped countries is called technological catch-up.
36 The existence of financial systems ends up magnifying cyclical fluctuations (Dow, 1986: 247). That is, the behaviour of banks, due to their
optimistic or pessimistic expectations, makes financial cycles inevitable (Keynes, 1970, Chapter 12).
37 The microeconomic analysis of innovation in the neo-Schumpeterian approach is not addressed in this paper. See Cimoli and Dosi (1995) for a
discussion about this approach and its connection with the macroeconomic analysis presented here.
38 This institutional setting is interpreted as encompassing both formal and informal institutions, as well as organizations. As Nelson (2008)
argues, the traditional neo-Schumpeterian approach places more emphasis on the organizations that integrate the NIS – such as research institutes,
universities, technology parks, amongst others.
39 The decisions regarding the absorption or creation of innovations are also influenced by these costs. Analysing the case of South Korea, Jacobsson
(1993) finds evidence that the effort (in terms of costs) required for the production of high-tech goods has grown considerably over the past decades.
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However, the existence of costs related to technology absorption (albeit lower than the costs of creating new tech-
ology) can slow or even block the technological catch-up of developing countries. Abramovitz (1986: 388) was
mongst the first authors to emphasize the importance of creating the right set of capabilities  to carry out techno-
ogical catch-up. He associates capabilities  with factors related to human capital and institutions (market structures,
overnance, financial systems, linkages, etc.).40 After him, however, many authors have emphasized the importance of
uilding capabilities to speed up technological catch-up.41 Thus, since capabilities/skills are acquired through learning
rocesses, it is possible to define capacity  as the knowledge (practical and/or theoretical) required to perform a given
ask. Consequently, this approach stresses once again the importance of knowledge  for growth. Thus, to stress the
mportance of acquiring capabilities to carry out technological catch-up is similar to say that to acquire advanced
echnical knowledge one must first acquire a certain level of basic knowledge. The acquisition of basic knowledge,
herefore, characterizes a pre-catch-up phase (see Verspagen, 1991).42
Albuquerque (1999) proposed a method to classify the level of development of each country’s NISs. He built
n Opportunity Taking Indicator (OTI), calculated dividing the country’s share in world’s patents (granted by the
SPTO), by the country’s share in world’s scientific articles (indexed by the ISI). The numerator is a proxy  for
echnology production, and the denominator is a proxy  for scientific production. Thus, indicators close to (or above)
ne indicate high capacity to transform scientific knowledge into technology/innovation, suggesting that the country
ossesses a mature NIS. By contrast, indicators below one indicate low capacity to transform scientific knowledge
nto technology/innovation, suggesting that the country possesses an immature NIS. Thus, it is argued that developing
40 Since both the neo-Schumpeterian and the post-Keynesian theories consider that banks decisions of resource allocation are crucial for innovation,
ifferent arrangements of the financial system have distinct influences on the generation of innovations and on income growth (see Gerschenkron,
962; Zysman, 1982; Christensen, 1992). Such arrangements, however, are considered part of each country’s NIS.
41 In the neo-Schumpeterian literature there are references to “technological capabilities” (Lall, 1992), “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal,
990), “learning capacity” (Verspagen, 1991) and to “social capacities” (Abramovitz, 1986). This paper, however, does not seek to develop a more
horough discussion of the differences between these terms, and adopts a general approach that stresses the importance of capabilities.
42 This paper does not seek to discuss what specific capabilities are necessary for catch-up. See Lall (1992).
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countries with indicators associated with a mature NIS would be absorbing technology created abroad, i.e. performing
technological catch-up.
Following the historical analysis of development processes proposed by Gerschenkron (1962), several studies linked
to neo-Schumpeterian approach emphasize that a mature NIS can be composed of different institutional arrangements.43
Freeman (1995) used the examples of Japan and USSR to highlight the impact of specific historical and institutional
backgrounds on the configuration of each country’s NIS. The author pointed out that although extremely high spending
on R&D is observed in both countries, the former managed to develop a mature NIS, while the latter did not. According
to Freeman (1995: 11–12), this shows that “simply to commit greater resources to R&D did not in itself guarantee
successful innovation, diffusion and productivity gains”. For him, the fundamental difference between the two systems
was the strong presence of internal R&D in Japan, as opposed to R&D developed in universities and research institutes
in the USSR. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in the USSR the incentive for innovation at the firm level was extremely
low, making the productive incorporation of innovations generated in the institutes considerably difficult. Hence, despite
the high spending on R&D, the USSR was unable to generate an institutional arrangement that enabled an efficient
relationship between production units and research institutes.44
Although the neo-Schumpeterian literature avoids proposing a general configuration for mature NISs, it is possible
to identify in the neo-Schumpeterian literature some policies usually associated with the acquisition of the capabilities
necessary for technological development. Abramovitz (1986), Lall (1992) and others, emphasize the importance of
education and infrastructure, as well as broader macroeconomic and industrial policies. Lall (1992) and Nelson and Pack
(1999) emphasize the importance of specific policies that aim to encourage exports. Moreover, these authors stress also
the relevance of welfare policies that seek to reduce the conflicts that emerge due to the technological and productive
transformations associated with the catch-up processes. Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 138), in turn, emphasize the
importance of R&D expenditure, arguing that such expenses are fundamental not only to create innovations, but also to
enable the absorption of foreign technology. Finally, reviewing the empirical studies related to the neo-Schumpeterian
approach, Fagerberg (1994) indicates the importance of the effort (measured by investment, infrastructure, etc.) to
acquire knowledge (measured by education, R&D, patents, etc.) in determining productivity growth.45
Thus, it is noteworthy that although the neo-Schumpeterian approach emphasizes the importance of tacit knowledge
(especially related to linkages and networks in the productive and innovative structures) for technological progress and
income growth, considerable emphasis is placed on the importance of acquiring codified knowledge (e.g. education,
science, and research) to enable technological progress.
4.  Contributions  to  understanding  the  dynamics  of  innovation  from  a  post-Keynesian  perspective
As noted in Section 2, post-Keynesian theory emphasizes the importance of investment for economic growth.
Technological progress, in turn, is rarely addressed in the works of Keynes, and its importance is considered only
in terms of its influence on the profitability of investment (Crocco, 2008: 281). Hence, much of the post-Keynesian
literature considers innovation a factor associated with capital accumulation due to its impact on expected returns.
However, according to Crocco (2008: 282), post-Keynesian models generally “do not explain how  technological
opportunities are generated (.  . .) and completely neglect the role of technical knowledge in the investment decision”.
Although the Kaldorian tradition within post-Keynesian economics is an exception to this rule, the neo-Schumpeterian
analysis on innovation discussed in the previous section can be combined with the post-Keynesian approach to help
43 See Sharif (2006) for a discussion of the reasons for the flexibility of the concept of NIS within the neo-Schumpeterian tradition.
44 Regarding Latin America (LA) and Asia, Freeman (1995: 13) argues that the fall in per capita GDP growth in LA in view of the continued
growth of Asia is largely explained by the introduction of more radical social reforms in the Asian countries, such as land reform and universal (and
improving) education. This argument indicates the importance of factors related to increased capacity for the formation of a mature NIS. According
to Freeman (1995: 18), therefore, the intensification of globalization has not reduced the role of the state on promoting growth, but has instead
increased the importance of states’ actions related to design, implementation and support of NISs. Thus, while some authors argue that economic
globalization (especially through multinational companies) has promoted technological diffusion and greater homogenization of technology across
countries, Porter (1990) and Patel and Pavit (1991) emphasize that: (i) large firms develop most of their technological activity in their countries of
origin and (ii) that technological activities are significantly influenced by the characteristics of the country of origin.
45 The high correlation between variables, however, complicates the determination of the relevance of each one of them in the explanation of
technological catch-up.
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olving this important limitation. This section discusses the role of knowledge (tacit and codified) in investment
ecisions and innovation.
.1.  Determinants  of  private  spending  on  R&D
This section introduces firms’ decision to invest in R&D into Keynes’ asset choice model discussed in Section
.2. In the present analysis, innovations are considered a particular type of asset, which has in investment in R&D its
rimary cost. Following Freeman (1995) and Cohen and Levinthal (1990), however, it is crucial to note that although
rivate spending on R&D is considered critical both to create and to absorb technology, such spending might not be
ufficient to fulfil these goals.
In order to introduce innovations (or private spending on R&D) into the asset choice model, it is first necessary to
nalyse the general characteristics of this asset, given the attributes considered in the model. Note, however, that inven-
ions only become innovations when they are introduced into production and/or commercialization. Furthermore, note
lso that the discussion presented in this paper places more attention on innovations related to product differentiation
han on innovations related to improvements in production techniques and equipment.
Within the asset choice model, the main attribute of innovations is their high expected return (q  + a −  c) (Perez and
oete, 1988).46 However, another important feature of innovations is the high uncertainty surrounding their performance
n the market, which implies a very low liquidity premium, i.e. high (non-probabilistic) risk (r  = −l). The high risk
elated to the introduction of innovations has two distinct sources. First, investment in R&D does not guarantee that
nnovations will be obtained. Second, the creation of an innovation does not guarantee that extraordinary profits will
e obtained, since such profits still depend on the performance (demand) of the new product in the market. Thus,
he absence of a pre-existing market to guide the decision to introduce an innovation makes it difficult to predict
emand and product acceptance, while the possibility of emergence of competing innovations increases even more the
ncertainty about the returns of each innovation (Dosi, 1982; Cimoli and Dosi, 1995).
.2.  Knowledge,  conﬁdence,  conventions  and  innovations
As noted in the previous section, innovations are pervaded by high uncertainty, presenting small liquidity premium
nd large expected returns. Thus, it is crucial to analyse how expectations are formed to guide the decision to search for
nnovations (via absorption or creation of technology).47 In other words, this section analyses the extent to which the
ost-Keynesian analysis of uncertainty and formation of expectations can contribute to better understand the decision
o invest in R&D.
To analyse the process of formation of expectations related to the decision to pursue innovation, Crocco (2008)
ifferentiates incremental and radical innovations. Following Dosi (1982), Crocco (2008) uses the definitions of tech-
ological trajectory (TT) and technological paradigm (TP) to define incremental and radical innovations. Incremental
nnovations are defined as innovations that follow a certain TT, while radical  innovations  are defined as innovations
hat change the TP, thus initiating a new TT. Seeking to transpose the analysis of innovation to the post-Keynesian
pproach to the formation of expectations, however, Crocco (2008) adds that incremental innovations are developed
ith the existing (fixed) capital stock, while radical innovations are developed with new capital stock.48
According to Crocco (2008: 286), the process of formation of expectations related to the introduction of incrementalnnovations does not fit easily into the state of LTE or into STE. With respect to STE, while incremental innovations
upposedly occur with a given stock of capital, the decision to introduce these innovations is associated with con-
iderably higher degrees of uncertainty than the simple daily decision of how much to produce, since the impact of
46 Intellectual property rights and patents seek to guarantee that inventors will extract the profits from their inventions, aiming to encourage the
ursuit of innovations – although the absence of such mechanism does not necessarily mean that innovations are not economically attractive.
47 Note that foreign technology can represent an innovation in the home market.
48 Another possible scenario is the production of an existing good with the introduction of more advanced production technique. In this case, the
rm is not creating an innovation, but incorporating an innovation (new capital good) developed in another country or in the capital goods sector.
owever, if some learning effort is required to operate the new capital good, then the costs associated with this effort can be included in the R&D
xpenditure and keep the same analysis applied to the creation of an innovation for the analysis of the absorption of innovations (despite the fact
hat the levels of expenses are different). This is the approach adopted throughout this paper.
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these innovations extends by more than just one period of time. With respect to the state of LTE, the introduction of
an incremental innovation is not associated with the same degree of uncertainty associated with the purchase of new
capital goods neither, again due to the period of time involved in these decisions.
For Crocco (2008), the characteristics of incremental innovation require the introduction of medium-term expecta-
tions (MTE) in the original post-Keynesian analysis. “Medium-term expectations are concerned with a new product
that is at the same time a development of the previous one. Holding everything else constant, this means that a firm can
affect its own demand by launching a new product in the market” (Crocco, 2008: 287).49 This stresses the existence
of an element of continuity associated with the inherent change related to incremental innovations. This continuity,
in turn, is derived from the fact that each incremental innovation is linked to a particular TT, which makes it slightly
easier to form expectations about the market performance of the innovation (unless a change in the TP occurs – Crocco,
2008: 290). Tacit (practical) knowledge related to a particular technology and to market behaviour increases along
the TT, increasing firms’ confidence due to the impact of tacit knowledge on uncertainty perception.50 According
to Crocco (2008: 292), in the case of continuous introduction of incremental innovations, the state of LTE becomes
partially endogenous, depending to a large extent on firms’ past performance in the introduction of innovations related
to a particular TT.51 However, the author points out that the introduction of innovations in Keynes’ analysis of the
formation of expectations does not change the core of the post-Keynesian theory.
Regarding the formation of expectations about the introduction of radical innovations, Crocco (2008: 297) argues
that this process is similar to the formation of expectations about investments in capital goods, which follow the state
of LTE. Radical innovations, however, are associated with changes in the TP and with high degrees of uncertainty,
so that projecting the current situation into the future does not seem to be a satisfactory form of dealing with the
uncertainty involved in the process. Hence, the decision to introduce radical innovations seems to be more dependent
on codified knowledge. The effect of codified knowledge into the formation of a strongly positive state of LTE
works mainly through conﬁdence. Due to the high degree of uncertainty about future returns, confidence in the firm’s
prognostic becomes particularly relevant. Codified knowledge, in this case, is crucial to assess the viability of the
innovation in solving the practical problem it is addressing. Furthermore, codified knowledge helps also with risk
analysis by exploring the experiences of radical innovations observed in other firms/industries throughout history. The
greater importance of codified knowledge for radical innovation does not mean tacit knowledge is not relevant. The
accumulation of tacit knowledge is crucial for innovation, given the importance of this type of knowledge for any type
of investment due to its relevance for understanding market movements (e.g. Hirschman, 1958; see also Raposo and
Resende, 2012). Nonetheless, although tacit knowledge is always important (in view of past experiences of introducing
radical innovations), it loses some space to codified knowledge in radical innovation due to its greater disassociation
in relation to the existing market conditions and TT.
Finally, it is important to note that establishing a situation of constant introduction of innovations leads to the
creation of a convention  to  innovate. With constant increases in the number of innovations, the expectation that other
firms will innovate encourages firms to invest in the search for innovations (R&D), raising technological development
and income growth. After some time, if innovations continue to be introduced, investment in R&D and the search for
innovations become conventions.
49 Although a fuller discussion of the relationship between supply and demand is not the purpose of this paper, it is crucial to note that a possible
point of conflict between the post-Keynesian and the neo-Schumpeterian approaches is the importance that each of these theories attributes to
demand and supply factors in determining growth. This is an issue that seems to still require further discussion. In this paper, as in others (e.g. Dosi,
1982; Cimoli and Dosi, 1995; Crocco et al., 2008), supply and demand interact with each other, and both influence decisions.
50 According to Crocco (2008: 288), knowledge created through internal R&D can counteract the negative effect of disappointments.
51 Innovation dynamics in sectors producing capital goods follows the same logic, except for the fact that STE in this sector must follow the state
of LTE of firms producing final goods using these goods capital (Crocco, 2008: 298). It should also be emphasized that although Keynes (1970,
Chapter 11) call attention to the fact that the expected introduction of new and more productive capital goods (innovation) reduces the expected
return of existing capital goods (marginal efficiency capital), the fact that knowledge accumulation influences the future performance of firms acts
to offset this reduction in the expected return of the existing capital. In other words, the expectation that knowledge accumulation might influence
future earnings, also the expectation that if this accumulation does not occur a competitor can obtain an advantage in the future (as a result of having
accumulated such knowledge) counteracts the expectation that capital goods will be more efficient in the future than in the present. This effect,
however, depends also on the current TT, since at the end of the each TT the benefits of knowledge accumulation are lower than at its beginning –
see Crocco (2008: 298–299) for similar arguments.
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As noted in Section 2.5, conventions  influence the state of LTE through their impact on the formation of LTE, since
hey provide information about the likely actions of agents.52 Thus, when the introduction of innovations becomes
idespread in the economy and a convention to innovate is established, it becomes common (tacit) knowledge that the
arket dynamic (competition) in this economy involves, to a large extent, the introduction of innovations. Consequently,
hile firms continue to take into account the risks and uncertainty involved in the search for innovations, the recognition
tacit knowledge) that innovations will arise and determine market performance results in the establishment of a general
nderstanding that the search for innovations is a conventional  activity. Thus, the existence of this convention to
nnovate influences firms’ LTE. This brief explorative analysis emphasizes the importance of carrying out more careful
nd thorough studies on how institutions (among them conventions) are created, sustained and changed.
In the neo-Schumpeterian tradition, as discussed in Section 3, the conformation of this convention to innovate is
ssociated with the maturity of the NIS. According to Dosi (1982) and Crocco (2003), the direction of innovations,
specially in the case of radical innovations, is influenced by social knowledge, i.e. the social and institutional structures
f each society.
In short, although both incremental and radical innovations depend on codified and tacit knowledge, it is argued
ere that the absorption/creation of incremental innovations depends to a greater extent on tacit  knowledge  (practical
 related to the current TT) while the absorption/creation of radical innovations depends to a greater extent on codiﬁed
nowledge (theoretical – related to the possibilities of the new TP). It is crucial to note, however, that investment and
nnovation feed back into the state of LTE through increases in tacit knowledge, which stresses the relevance of this
ype of knowledge for technological progress and income growth.
.  Concluding  remarks
This paper stressed how the post-Keynesian theory, associated with the neo-Schumpeterian analysis of innovation,
an contribute to improve the understanding of the factors that influence innovation. More specifically, the paper aimed
o highlight the importance of knowledge, both tacit and codified, for the formation of a strongly positive state  of LTE.
his state, in turn, guides the decision to search for innovations and to invest in R&D. This impact takes place through
wo channels: (i) strengthening conﬁdence  in LTE and (ii) establishing a convention  to  innovate.
Firstly, although post-Keynesian theory puts more emphasis on the importance of tacit knowledge and neo-
chumpeterian theory puts more emphasis on the relevance of codified knowledge, it was argued that both types
f knowledge are important in strengthening the state  of LTE. In particular, given the higher degree of uncertainty
ssociated with radical innovations, it was argued that such innovations are more dependent on the accumulation of cod-
fied knowledge, while incremental innovations (inserted into an existing TT) are more dependent on tacit knowledge
bout the current market conditions and TT.
Secondly, it was also argued that the accumulation of knowledge collaborates to establish a situation of constant
ntroduction of innovations, which contributes to create a convention  to  innovate.  The (tacit) knowledge that other firms
re constantly seeking innovations and that innovations determine market performance leads to the establishment of
his convention in economies where innovations are constantly introduced, in spite of the high degree of uncertainty
nherently associated with innovation. In both post-Keynesian and neo-Schumpeterian theories, following conventional
ehaviour is a form of dealing with uncertainty. The convention to innovate, which can also be understood as the
ormation of an innovative culture, motivates private spending in R&D by increasing agents’ expectations about what
etermines marker performance.
The paper stressed, therefore, that the conformation of a mature NIS impacts the state of LTE through its impact on
nowledge accumulation, which provides an important incentive for investment and innovation.
The investigation carried out in this paper, however, provides only an initial analysis of some determinants of the
ecision to innovate that have not yet been adequately explored. Considerable work is still necessary to identify all
he factors involved in this decision, to determine the channels through which these factors operate, and to clearly
nderstand the relative importance of ach factor.
52 Transposing this logic to the analysis of innovation, Crocco (2003) stressed that social probable knowledge rises along the TT, increasing the
ocial weight of argument, which then increases agents’ confidence. Gradually, therefore, the use of a particular technology becomes a convention
Crocco, 2003: 188).
204 J.P. Romero / EconomiA 15 (2014) 189–205
Acknowledgements
I thank Marco Flávio Resende and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Research funding from the Brazilian
Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Level Personnel (CAPES) is also gratefully acknowledged.
References
Abramovitz, M., 1986. Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind. J. Econ. History 66 (2), 385–406.
Albuquerque, E.M., 1999. National system of innovation and non-OECD countries: notes about a tentative typology. Braz. Rev. Pol. Econ. 19 (4),
35–52.
Amado, A.M., 2000. Limites monetários ao crescimento: Keynes e a não-neutralidade da moeda. Ensaios FEE 21 (1), 44–81.
Carvalho, F.J.C., 1989. Fundamentos da escola pós-keynesiana: a teoria de uma economia monetária. In: Amadeo, E. (Ed.), Ensaios Sobre Economia
Política Moderna. Marco Zero, São Paulo.
Carvalho, F.J.C., 1993. Sobre a endogenia da oferta de moeda: réplica ao professor Nogueira da Costa. Rev. Econ. Pol. 13 (3), 114–121.
Carvalho, F.J.C., 1994. Mr. Keynes and the Post Keynesians. Aldershot, Edward Elgar.
Christensen, J.L., 1992. The role of finance in national system of innovation. In: Lundvall, B.-A. (Ed.), National System of Innovation: Towards a
Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning. Printer Pub., London, pp. 146–168.
Cimoli, M., Dosi, G., 1995. Technological paradigms, patterns of learning and development: an introductory roadmap. J. Evol. Econ. 5, 243–268.
Cohen, W., Levinthal, D., 1990. Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and innovation. Admin. Sci. Quart. 35, 128–158.
Crocco, M., 2003. Innovation and social probable knowledge. Camb. J. Econ. 27, 177–190.
Crocco, M., 2008. Technical change and formation of expectations. Metroeconomica 59 (2), 276–304.
Crocco, M., Albuquerque, E.M., Cavalcante, A.T.M., Brito, M.A., 2008. Patentes e Sistemas Financeiros: um estudo exploratório para o Brasil. Rev.
Bras. Inov. 7 (2), 367–407.
Dequech, D., 1999a. Uncertainty, conventions and short-term expectations. Braz. J. Pol. Econ. 19 (3), 67–81.
Dequech, D., 1999b. Expectations and confidence under uncertainty. J. Post-Keynesian Econ. 21 (3), 415–430.
Dequech, D., 2000. Asset choice, liquidity preference, and rationality under uncertainty. J. Econ. Issues 34 (1), 159–176.
Dosi, G., 1982. Technological paradigms and technological trajectories. Res. Policy 11, 147–162.
Dosi, G., Egidi, M., 1991. Substantive and procedural uncertainty: an exploration of economic behaviours in changing environments. J. Evol. Econ.
1, 145–168.
Dow, S., 1986. Post Keynesian monetary theory for an open economy. J. Post-Keynesian Econ. 9 (2), 237–257.
Dow, S., 1993. Money and the Economic Process. Aldershot, Edward Elgar.
Fagerberg, J., 1988. International competitiveness. Econ. J. 98, 355–374.
Fagerberg, J., 1994. Technology and international differences in growth rates. J. Econ. Lit. 32 (3), 1147–1175.
Freeman, C., 1995. The national system of innovation in historical perspective. Camb. J. Econ. 19, 5–24.
Gerschenkron, A., 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA.
Henriques, T.R.,2007. O papel do sistema financeiro brasileiro no sistema nacional de inovac¸ão: introduc¸ão à discussão a partir da PINTEC 2003.
In: Prêmio IPEA-Caixa 2007: monografias premiadas. IPEA, Brasília.
Hicks, J., 1967. Critical Essays on Monetary Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hirschman, A., 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Hodgson, G.M., 1988. Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Hodgson, G.M., 2006. What are institutions? J. Econ. Issues 40 (1), 1–25.
Jacobsson, S., 1993. The length of the infant industry period: evidence from the engineering industry in South Korea. World Dev. 21 (3), 407–419.
Jayme Jr., F.G., Resende, M.F.C., 2009. Crescimento econômico e restric¸ão externa: teoria e a experiência brasileira. In: Michel, R., Carvalho, L.
(Eds.), Crescimento econômico: setor externo e inflac¸ão. IPEA, Rio de Janeiro.
Kaldor, N., 1966. Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic Growth of the United Kingdom. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Keynes, J.M., 1937a. The general theory of employment. Quart. J. Econ. 51 (2), 209–223.
Keynes, J.M., 1937b. The “ex-ante” theory of the rate of interest. Econ. J. 47 (188), 663–669.
Keynes, J.M., 1970. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Macmillan, London.
Kregel, J., 1976. Economic methodology in the face of uncertainty: the modeling methods of Keynes and the Post-Keynesians. Econ. J. 86, 209–225.
Lall, S., 1992. Technological capabilities and industrialization. World Dev. 20 (2), 165–186.
Lundvall, B.-A. (Ed.), 1992. National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning. Printer Pub., London.
Minsky, H., 1986. Stabilizing and Unstable Economy. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Myrdal, G., 1957. Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions. Duckworth, London.
Nelson, R.R. (Ed.), 1993. National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Nelson, R.R., 2008. What enables rapid economic progress: what are the needed institutions? Res. Policy 37, 1–11.
Nelson, R.R., Pack, H., 1999. The Asian miracle and modern growth theory. Econ. J. 109 (457), 416–436.
North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Oliveira, F.H.P., Jayme Jr., F.G., Lemos, M.B., 2006. Increasing returns to scale and international diffusion of technology: an empirical study for
Brazil (1976–2000). World Dev. 34 (1), 75–88.
O’Sullivan, M., 2005. Finance and innovation. In: Fagerberg, J., Momery, D.C., Nelson, R.R. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
PP
P
P
P
P
R
R
R
R
S
S
S
V
ZJ.P. Romero / EconomiA 15 (2014) 189–205 205
atel, P., Pavit, K., 1991. Large firms in the production of the world’s technology: an important case of ‘Non-Globalisation’. J. Int. Business Stud.
22 (1), 1–21.
aula, L.F., 1999. Teoria da firma bancária. In: Macroeconomia Moderna: Keynes e a economia contemporânea. Campus, Rio de Janeiro, pp.
171–189.
aula, L.F., 2011. Sistema Financeiro e o Financiamento da Inovac¸ão: Uma abordagem keynesiana-schumpeteriana. In: 39 Encontro Nacional de
Economia ANPEC, Foz do Iguac¸u.
erez, C., Soete, L., 1988. Catching up in technology: entry barriers and windows of opportunity. In: Dosi, G., et al. (Eds.), Technical Change and
Economic Theory. Macmillan, London.
orter, M.E., 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. Macmillan, London.
osner, M.V., 1961. International trade and technical change. Oxford Econ. Papers 13 (3), 323–341.
aposo, D.A., Resende, M.F.C., 2012. Causac¸ão circular do crescimento das economias em desenvolvimento: uma ponte entre as abordagens
evolucionária e pós-keynesiana. In: 40 Encontro Nacional de Economia-ANPEC, Porto de Galinhas.
esende, M.F.C., Raposo, D.A., 2008. National innovation system, trade elasticities and economic growth. In: 36 Encontro Nacional de Economia-
ANPEC, Salvador.
omero, J.P., Jayme Jr., F.G., 2012. Financial system, innovation and regional development: a study on the relationship between liquidity preference
and innovation in Brazil. Rev. Pol. Econ. 24 (4), 623–642.
omero, J.P., Silveira, F., Britto, G., 2011. Structural change, the national innovation system and the balance-of-payments constraint: a theoretical
and empirical analysis of the Brazilian case. In: Workshop on Thirlwall’s Law and Balance-of-Payments constrained growth, Coimbra.
harif, N., 2006. Emergence and development of the National Innovation Systems concept. Res. Policy 35, 745–766.
ollow, R., 1956. A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quart. J. Econ. 70 (1), 65–94.
tudart, R., 1995. Investment Finance in Economic Development. Routledge, London.
erspagen, B., 1991. A new empirical approach to catching up or falling behind. Struct. Change Econ. Dynam. 2 (2), 359–380.
ysman, J., 1983. Governments, Markets and Growth. Cornell University Press, London.
